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Background
Th  ere exists no consistent explanation for why some 
countries are successful in combating HIV/AIDS and 
others are not [1]. We need an explanation in order to 
design eﬀ  ective policies and programmes to address HIV/
AIDS, as well as to identify eﬃ   cient allocations of scarce 
government and donor funds. Th  e primary aim of this 
paper is to determine the factors that have allowed some 
countries to successfully combat HIV/AIDS, while other 
countries have struggled. Speciﬁ  cally, I test the hypothesis 
that strategies used in sub-Saharan African countries in 
the 1980s and 1990s to slow population growth impacted 
later success in reducing the prevalence and incidence of 
HIV, as well as in providing antiretroviral (ARV) therapy to 
HIV-positive individuals. In so doing, I emphasize the 
importance of macro contextual factors, including 
governmental policy and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), in determining HIV-related outcomes.
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about HIV prevalence or incidence. And although preva-
lence and incidence rates are ﬁ  nally declining in many 
African countries [2], there still remains much work to be 
done in identifying the factors associated with successful 
responses to the epidemic, particularly in the realm of 
prevention. Using a case study approach, much of the 
existing research identiﬁ  es political will and the capacity 
of African governments as predictive of HIV outcomes 
[3-8]. But some weak countries, like Uganda, have 
enacted positive change, while some of the richest coun-
tries, with the most capable governments, like Botswana 
and South Africa, have experienced persistently high 
prevalence rates.
Th  e case study methodology thus fails to achieve the 
generalizations made possible by statistical analysis of 
more observations. Previously used methodological 
approaches therefore produce insuﬃ   cient evidence for 
use in designing health-related interventions. To circum-
vent these issues, I rely on between-country variation in 
organizational and structural factors, particularly those 
associated with population interventions, in order to try 
to explain variation in HIV outcomes. Speciﬁ  cally,  I 
analyze data on all sub-Saharan African countries to test 
for a statistically signiﬁ   cant association between the 
organizational and political structures resulting from 
eﬀ  orts to address population growth in the 1980s and 
1990s, and HIV outcomes in the 2000s.
Figure 1 shows the model I test, which posits, in short, 
that countries that developed organizational and political 
structures related to providing family planning and 
moder  ating population growth were left with the 
resources and infrastructure necessary to mount more 
eﬀ   ective HIV/AIDS interventions. Stage 1 refers to 
govern  mental and social eﬀ   orts to reduce population 
growth, which included national population policies and 
programmes designed to limit fertility, acquisition of 
donor funds for family planning, construction of physical 
and bureaucratic structures for providing contraceptive 
services and supplies, and the creation of local NGOs in 
the reproductive healthcare ﬁ  eld.  Th  ese eﬀ  orts, which 
began as early as the 1960s in some countries, predated 
HIV/AIDS, which was not widely diagnosed until the 
mid-1980s.
Th   e degree to which governments and societies 
engaged in such eﬀ  orts inﬂ  uenced Stage 2 of the model, a 
set of intermediate outcomes that resulted from these 
eﬀ   orts – domestication of techniques for behaviour 
change [9], governmental experience with donors, govern-
mental and NGO familiarity with social mobilization 
eﬀ   orts to induce behaviour change, and even family 
planning technologies (e.g., condoms) – that could then 
be translated into HIV-reduction eﬀ  orts. Th  ese  eﬀ  orts, or 
lack thereof, in conjunction with factors ranging from 
culture to political economy to the status of women, then 
impacted the physical determinants of HIV prevalence, 
as shown in Stage 3, ultimately driving overall HIV 
outcomes in Stage 4.
Th   e hypothesis that there exists a relationship between 
population-related interventions and later HIV outcomes 
rests on the assumption that many of the obstacles faced 
when implementing family planning programmes are 
similar to those experienced when implementing HIV 
prevention programmes. Th  ese include, and are not 
limited to, the challenges associated with talking about 
sex, particularly with young people, as well as concerns 
over altering sources of authority for sexual decision 
making. Simply put, preventing pregnancy and prevent-
ing HIV in sub-Saharan Africa both require that people 
change the way(s) they have sex. In both instances, 
govern  ments, organizations and international actors with 
large sums of money have involved themselves, leading to 
a continuity of issues, actors and outcomes across inter-
ventions. For these reasons, we should see a relationship 
between earlier population interventions and later HIV 
outcomes.
Th  is research adds to a small but growing body of 
literature addressing the links between population and 
HIV interventions. Stillwaggon [10] criticizes HIV inter-
ventions for paralleling population interventions and 
Figure 1. Conceptual model.
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and HIV transmission, speciﬁ   cally poverty. Richey 
[11,12] points to the continued narrow focus of popula-
tion interventions, even in the era of reproductive health, 
on family planning, which comes at the expense of an 
integrated approach that includes HIV/AIDS. And 
Cleland and Watkins [9,13], while noting important 
diﬀ  er  ences between the two issues, state, “Th  e  ambitions, 
assumptions and implementation of both [population 
and AIDS] movements are strikingly similar and the 
social processes by which the AIDS crisis is ultimately 
resolved are likely to be similar to the processes that 
earlier led to the widespread adoption of fertility control” 
[13, see page 208]. Th   is existing research, combined with 
the analysis in this article, supports the importance of 
analyzing the history of sex-related interventions in order 
to develop better policies and programmes, and ulti-
mately improve human wellbeing.
Th   e following section provides background on popula-
tion interventions in Africa and the known deter  mi  nants 
of successful HIV outcomes. I then discuss the examples 
of Senegal and Malawi, which illustrate the connections 
between the organizations and political structures 
associated with population interventions and later HIV 
outcomes, as a precursor to the statistical analysis that 
forms the core of the paper.
Population interventions in Africa
Between the early 1960s, when most African countries 
gained independence, and the late 1970s, pregnancy 
prevention was not a primary concern of most African 
governments, organizations or individuals. A combina-
tion of economic and social motivations promoted high 
fertility norms at the individual level, and these were 
reﬂ  ected at the national level by positive views towards 
population growth, which many African governments 
saw as a means to increase the size of their economies 
and to achieve scale eﬃ   ciencies in production. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, private, non-governmental family 
plan  ning organizations began to crop up in a number of 
countries, meeting the burgeoning demand for contra-
ceptive services of primarily a well-to-do urban clientele, 
and by 1980, approximately half of African countries had 
such an organization [14]. By the 1980s, as recession 
loomed globally and donors promoted structural adjust-
ment programmes and population reduction locally, some 
African governments began to view 2% to 3% annual 
population growth rates as a burden that challenged their 
promises to educate and employ citizens, as well as keep 
them healthy.
Population policies designed to limit population growth 
through reduced fertility were one result of this shift in 
perspective. Although Kenya and Ghana announced 
policies in 1967 and 1969, respectively [15,16], following 
these early declarations, there was an almost 20-year lag 
before a glut of policy announcements started in 1986 
when Kenya announced a revised policy, and continued 
in 1988 when Nigeria, Senegal and Liberia adopted 
policies [17,18]. Th   is trend continued through 1999, with 
27 additional countries adopting new policies, and Ghana 
adopting a revised policy. Since then, no country out of 
the 15 remaining countries without policies has announced 
one, although some countries have revised their policies 
[19]. Generally speaking, these policies focus on reducing 
population growth as a means to achieve improved 
standards of living.
In addition to representing government willingness to 
address issues related to sex, population policies matter 
for a number of reasons. First, countries that adopted 
population policies received, on average, more funding 
from the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment [20]. Second, countries with population policies 
experienced statistically greater fertility declines between 
1987 and 2002 than those without such policies: 21% 
compared with 14% (author’s calculations from the 
World Bank [21]). Th  ird, countries with population 
policies have a greater potential to improve gender and 
human rights because the policies motivate discussion of 
sex, generation and power, and provide language to 
groups promoting such rights [22].
Determinants of successful HIV/AIDS outcomes
Th   e key mechanisms through which reductions in HIV/
AIDS have been, and can be, realized are decreases in the 
number of overall and concurrent sexual partners, 
increases in condom use, increases in the age at ﬁ  rst sex, 
and prevalence of male circumcision [23-32]. Existing 
scholarship has identiﬁ  ed two main factors that operate 
through these mechanisms to determine country-level 
success in addressing HIV/AIDS: (1) political leadership 
and commitment; and (2) government coordination with 
NGOs and other civil society organizations.
Political commitment and leadership should help 
reduce HIV prevalence because they galvanize action 
around HIV/AIDS, organize those eﬀ  orts, and provide 
legitimacy to messages promoting behaviour change 
[3-7,33-36]. Th  ere remains, however, no convincing 
cross-national study that shows that political commit-
ment leads to reductions in prevalence of HIV, although 
factors such as lack of ethnic fragmentation [37] and 
press freedom, income equality and high HIV prevalence 
[38] lead to high levels of political commitment, and 
countries with “good” leadership provide better care to 
their HIV-positive citizens [39].
Th   e second prominent factor associated with successful 
reductions in HIV prevalence is government interaction 
with civil society, broadly understood to include NGOs, 
community-based organizations, religious organizations, 
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Coordination with such groups provides the conduits 
through which messages about prevention are spread, as 
well as increases the perceived legitimacy of messages 
that cover sensitive issues relating to sex, morality and 
religion.
Th  e most-frequently studied AIDS success stories in 
Africa are Uganda and Senegal. In Uganda, HIV preva-
lence declined from approximately 20% to 10% in the 
1990s [30]. Th   e mechanisms for Uganda’s decline were a 
decrease in number of sexual partners and an increase in 
condom usage [30,40]. Th  e drivers for these changes 
included political leadership on the part of the country’s 
charismatic president, Yoweri Museveni, a decentralized 
government that allowed for local experimentation and 
personalization of responses to HIV/AIDS, and active 
incorporation of diﬀ   erent social groups in prevention 
eﬀ  orts [6,23,40-43].
In Senegal, HIV prevalence has remained at approxi-
mately 1% since the 1980s [23]. Th   e mechanisms for this 
lack of increase in prevalence include low numbers of 
multiple concurrent sexual partners, a less virulent form 
of the virus (HIV-2), an increase in the age at marriage 
and ﬁ   rst sex, and almost universal male circumcision 
[7,8]. Th  ese outcomes resulted from early government 
acknow  ledgement of HIV, eﬀ   ective management of 
sexually transmitted infections among sex workers, and 
active incorporation of social groups, particularly 
religiously oriented ones, in distributing HIV-prevention 
messages [8,23,34,42,44-47].
Th   e emphasis of the literature on political commitment, 
and on the cases of Senegal and Uganda, poses three 
challenges to determining the causes of variation in 
country-level success addressing HIV/AIDS. First, political 
commitment is a diﬃ   cult variable to measure [7,34,35,48] 
and may not actually translate into action once countries 
have learned that displays of political commitment are 
necessary to garner and maintain international support 
[42,46]. Second, the cases of Senegal and Uganda do not 
generalize well. In Uganda, the timing of the decline in 
HIV prevalence indicates that behaviour change most 
likely occurred prior to intervention by Museveni and 
international donors, and so is probably not the result of 
policy [1,30,49]. In Senegal, there is no way to know 
whether the epidemic would have actually grown out of 
control in the absence of the government actions taken 
[50], particularly given the relative protection provided to 
the population by near-universal male circumcision and 
other factors.
Th  e third challenge to determining the causes of 
variation in country-level success addressing HIV/AIDS is 
that although the literature has identiﬁ  ed  government 
engagement with civil society as key to ﬁ  ghting HIV/AIDS, 
no systematic research has incorporated measurements of 
the strength of civil society. Th  e analysis that follows 
addresses all three challenges to the existing literature by 
testing a new hypothesis about the legacy of population 
interventions, employing a multi-country analysis, and 
incorporating information on the historical depth of 
NGOs. Th  ese contextual factors are highly likely to 
impact HIV-related outcomes.
The examples of Senegal and Malawi
Population and HIV interventions in both Senegal and 
Malawi provide support for the hypothesis that experi  ence 
with country-level population interventions impacted 
later success in addressing HIV/AIDS. In Senegal, there 
is evidence that some of the factors associated with its 
successful response to HIV mirror previous experience 
gained in response to population issues, including the 
development of NGOs, government support of sex-
related health issues, and government and NGO inter-
action with religious leaders. In Malawi, there is evidence 
that negative experiences with population interventions 
may have spilled over onto early HIV eﬀ  orts. I provide 
these cases to illustrate the potential causal pathways 
through which the variables representing population 
interventions included in the statistical analysis that 
follows (early family planning NGOs and the existence of 
a population policy) may have inﬂ  uenced HIV outcomes.
As mentioned, Senegal was a vanguard population 
policy adopter in 1988. While the policy resulted from an 
intersection of national and donor goals, practically it 
represented the willingness of the government to address 
issues related to sex. In addition, through the 1980s and 
mid-1990s, Senegal ranked in the top third of African 
countries based on the degree of eﬀ   ort put towards 
providing family planning services and supplies [51]. 
Th  ese government eﬀ  orts were rewarded by donors, as 
Senegal was a popular recipient of international aid for 
population activities [52].
In addition to positive government eﬀ  orts  towards 
family planning, Senegal’s strong civil society encom-
passed a number of reproductive health NGOs. In 1985, 
prior to the emergence of HIV/AIDS, there were 31 local 
NGOs doing some work in the area of reproductive 
health in Senegal [19], and this ﬁ  gure grew to 57 by 1989. 
One of the most important NGOs involved in family 
planning and sexual health in Senegal, the Association 
Sénégalaise pour le Bien-être Familial, or ASBEF, was 
founded in 1975 and aﬃ     liated with the International 
Planned Parenthood Federation in 1981. It provides 
sexual and reproductive health services, particularly 
contra  ception, to youths as well as to women through 
clinics in the majority of Senegal’s regions.
NGOs helped facilitate dialogue on population issues 
with religious leaders, civil society and the government. 
A national seminar entitled “Islam et Population” was 
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also hosted a roundtable on Islam and family planning in 
1989. Th   en, following the 1994 United Nations confer  ence 
on population and development held in Cairo, Egypt, a 
set of networks related to religion and contra  cep  tion 
were formed. One was the Réseau des Parlementaires 
Sénégalais pour la Population et le Développement 
(Senegalese Network of Parliamentarians on Population 
and Development), making Senegal the ﬁ  rst country to 
have a network of parliamentarians working on popula-
tion issues.
Th  e existence of ties between the government and 
religious leaders, and between NGOs and religious leaders, 
also proved to be beneﬁ  cial in response to HIV. Speciﬁ  -
cally, outreach to civil society organizations, particularly 
religious ones, began with eﬀ   orts to promote family 
planning, and most likely spilled over into HIV preven-
tion eﬀ   orts. Senegalese government coordination with 
religious leaders on HIV dates from at least 1989, and in 
1994, the primary US-funded AIDS programme in 
Senegal, AIDSCAP, and the Senegalese government 
surveyed religious and political leaders regarding their 
attitudes towards AIDS [54]. One of the recommen-
dations from the analysis of this data was a national 
colloquium on religion and HIV, as religious leaders had 
indicated that they wanted to be involved in the response 
to AIDS [54], and this role was institutionalized with a 
major conference in 1995 between Muslim and Christian 
leaders [55].
An additional set of parallel conferences were held on 
religion and HIV. Th  e ﬁ  rst, in 1995, was entitled “AIDS 
and Religion: Th  e Response of Islam” [54], and was 
attended by Islamic religious leaders from all over the 
country. In addition to providing an important oppor-
tunity for dialogue, the key outcome from the conference 
was a statement that it was acceptable for serodiscordant 
couples to use condoms [54]. Th  e second, “AIDS and 
Religion: Responses of Christian Churches”, was held in 
1996, and was also attended by Islamic leaders [54]. 
Although there is no explicit evidence that religious 
leaders’ practice of dialoguing about family planning 
paved the way to similar conversations about HIV, the 
parallel experiences are certainly suggestive.
Malawi’s response to population growth diﬀ  ered 
dramatically from that of Senegal. Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda, president from 1964 to 1994, exercised a form of 
authoritarian rule that emphasized cultural nationalism, 
particularly respect for hierarchy and authority [56]. As a 
result, he found western “permissiveness” particularly 
threatening, and had a very narrow view of the role of 
women [56], both of which made family planning un-
acceptable and led him to ban it during the 1960s [15]. As 
donor interest in family planning increased in the 1980s, 
the Malawian government remained unwilling to fully 
endorse family planning, and so implemented a “child-
spacing” policy in 1982 with a goal to increase the 
number of years between births [15]. It was not until 
Malawi transitioned to democracy and Banda left oﬃ   ce 
in 1994 that the government adopted a national popu-
lation policy [15].
In parallel, through the 1980s, Malawi had family 
planning eﬀ   ort scores in the bottom third of African 
countries, and had only moved to the middle tier by the 
mid-1990s [57]. Th  e primary family planning organi  za-
tion in the country, Banja La Mtsogolo, was not founded 
until 1987, and the aﬃ   liate of the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation (IPPF) only came into existence 
in 1999 [19] when the government parastatal involved in 
family planning, the National Family Welfare Council, 
was privatized [58, see page 18].
Malawi’s initial response to HIV/AIDS was mixed. 
Despite being a medical doctor, President Banda had 
minimal commitment towards HIV/AIDS [43]. Th  e 
Ministry of Health’s National AIDS Control Programme, 
started in 1987 [34], was ultimately quite ineﬀ  ective [43]. 
AIDS was declared a national emergency in 1999, but this 
still did not provoke much local interest, and the removal 
of the National AIDS Control Programme from the 
Ministry of Health in 2001 in order to comply with World 
Bank guidelines, decimated the ministry and further 
hampered eﬀ  orts to address HIV [34]. Surface eﬀ  orts to 
address HIV/AIDS continued: a national AIDS policy 
followed in 2004, and that same year, HIV became a 
campaign issue for the ﬁ  rst time [43]. It was not really 
until ARV therapy became widely available in 2004 [59], 
however, that the intensity of the response to HIV 
skyrocketed in Malawi.
Th  e fact that the government began to care about 
population growth at the same time as HIV/AIDS was 
leading to increased mortality made the government’s 
eﬀ  orts in relationship to HIV all the more suspect [60]. 
Like family planning, HIV was also viewed as something 
dubious that came from abroad [61]. Family planning was 
seen as a western eﬀ  ort to take the fun out of sex, as were 
the condoms that health workers and NGOs insisted be 
used to protect against HIV. As a result, the acronym for 
AIDS was given an alternative interpretation: the 
“American Invention Depriving Sex” [61].
Amy Kaler [60] has explained the suspicion about AIDS 
and condoms as the “long shadow of population control”, 
describing how everyday Malawians’ interpretation of 
family planning eﬀ  orts impacted their understanding of 
AIDS and AIDS interventions. Speciﬁ  cally,  Malawians 
interpreted family planning eﬀ   orts as the combined 
eﬀ  orts of donors and the government to decimate the 
population of a country that was constantly begging for 
international aid. Given this degree of suspicion about 
population control, when the same actors began talking 
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those population control eﬀ  orts: a further concerted eﬀ  ort 
to eliminate the population. Because the same actors also 
proposed solutions for AIDS, particularly condoms, 
Malawians were understandably suspicious. As a result, 
condoms were viewed as dangerous, ineﬀ  ective  and 
possibly even the source of AIDS itself.
Th  e examples of Senegal and Malawi suggest that the 
nexus of interventions related to population growth and 
family planning both practically and symbolically struc-
tured the macro context in which these same countries 
addressed HIV. I turn to testing this hypothesis in the 
following statistical analysis, which looks particularly at 
whether countries had an early aﬃ     liate of the IPPF 
(which Senegal did and Malawi did not), as well as 
whether countries had a population policy.
Methods
Th  e objective of the analysis is to determine how 
government and social eﬀ  orts to slow population growth 
in the 1980s and 1990s in sub-Saharan African countries 
impacted HIV outcomes in the 2000s. Th  ese  population-
related eﬀ  orts included population policies and repro-
duc  tive healthcare NGOs. I next describe a unique data 
set that I constructed covering all sub-Saharan African 
countries that captures the institutional context, much of 
it built from population interventions, relevant to HIV 
outcomes.
I measure HIV outcomes in four ways: the change in 
adult HIV prevalence between 2001 and 2009; the change 
in adult HIV incidence between 2001 and 2009; the level 
of overall antiretroviral coverage in 2009; and the level of 
antiretroviral coverage for HIV-positive pregnant women 
to prevent vertical transmission in 2009. All data come 
from UNAIDS [2]. While the ideal dependent variable for 
assessing the impact of prevention interventions is 
change in incidence rates [1,24,62], I include an analysis 
of both prevalence and incidence rates given that greater 
uncertainty exists around estimates of incidence than 
around estimates of prevalence. As the analysis covers 
only sub-Saharan Africa, where the vast majority of 
countries have generalized epidemics, this means that 
national ﬁ  gures are estimated primarily from data from 
pregnant women attending antenatal clinics [63]. As 
estimates, these ﬁ  gures are subject to error resulting both 
from input data and the assumptions of the models 
themselves [64].
Despite these drawbacks, according to the most recent 
assessment [65], input data for sub-Saharan Africa are of 
generally high quality. Of the 45 countries for which data 
quality assessments exist for both 2001 and 2009, only 
seven were rated as having “poor” data quality both years 
[65,66], and approximately half of those countries were 
ultimately removed from the analysis because of missing 
data. Furthermore, UNAIDS’ models have been improved 
and reﬁ  ned over time [2,63], such that the data used for 
the analyses in this paper, although not perfect, are of the 
best quality available.
Data on the reported number of people receiving and 
needing antiretroviral therapy in 2009 are based on the 
World Health Organization’s 2010 guidelines, which 
include a lower cutoﬀ   to identify need for therapy than 
had been used up until that point [2]. Th   e percentage of 
HIV-positive pregnant women receiving antiretroviral 
therapy at the time of birth also comes from the same 
report, and I refer to this as prevention of mother to child 
transmission (PMTCT) coverage [2].
Variables that capture the degree of policy and organi-
zational resources available to a country in addressing 
HIV/AIDS include the following:
1. Existence of population policy. Th  is comes from the 
various population documents themselves, the Annual 
Review of Population Law [18] and the United Nations 
Population Fund and Population Reference Bureau 
[17,67] publication, Country Proﬁ   les for Population 
and Reproductive Health: Policy Developments and 
Indicators.
2. Early IPPF aﬃ   liate. Th  is indicates whether the IPPF 
had an aﬃ   liate in a given country before 1986 [14] as 
this date marks the point at which many African 
countries had their ﬁ  rst diagnosed case of AIDS. All 
but four countries (Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tomé et 
Principe, Somalia, and Zimbabwe) had an aﬃ   liate by 
2009. While some of these organizations were directly 
set up by IPPF, others were in existence already and 
then aﬃ     liated with the IPPF later, like ASBEF in 
Senegal. Th   e earliest organization was founded in 1932 
(South Africa) and the latest in 1999 (Malawi).
Variables that capture factors not directly related to 
organizations and policy, which might still inﬂ  uence HIV 
outcomes, include:
1. Economic wellbeing. Th   is is proxied by gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita, from the World Develop-
ment Indicators [68], and averaged over the period 
2001-2009.
2. Cultural fractionalization. Th  is is taken from Lieber-
man [37] and is originally from Fearon [69]. Cultural 
fractionalization is measured as the probability that 
two people drawn randomly from the population will 
be from two diﬀ  erent groups as deﬁ  ned by ethnicity 
and language, particularly emphasizing linguistic diﬀ  er-
ence. It ranges from 0 (no diversity) to 1 (complete 
diversity) and is a Herﬁ  ndahl Index calculated as 1 – 
ΣN
i=1si
2 where si is the share of group i out of N total 
groups. Easterly and Levine [70] and Lieberman [37] 
have shown that more diverse countries have worse 
outcomes because of challenges that such diversity 
poses to the allocation of public goods.
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de Walle [71], and is operationalized as a binary 
indicator for whether the country was a former British 
colony. Th   is variable serves as a proxy for institutions, 
as well as language.
Other variables likely to directly inﬂ  uence the degree of 
decline in HIV prevalence and incidence include:
1.  PEPFAR focus country. Th  is indicates whether a 
country was one of the 12 sub-Saharan African coun-
tries that were part of the original 15 focus countries of 
the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR). Th  is variable thus indicates the receipt of 
large amounts of HIV-related funding starting around 
2003.
2. Funding received from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria. Th  is is the total funds 
speciﬁ  cally for HIV activities disbursed to a country 
from the Global Fund between 2002 and 2009, divided 
by the country’s average population size during the 
period to create a per capita measure [72]. All coun-
tries except Cape Verde received some funding for 
HIV from the Global Fund during this time period.
3. Antiretroviral coverage (2006). Th   is is a measure of the 
proportion of those HIV-positive individuals in 2006 
in need of antiretroviral coverage who were receiving 
it, from the World Health Organization’s online 
database [73]; 2006 is the intervening year for which 
the most complete data are available and refers to the 
old cutoﬀ   for assessing need for ARVs. Better provision 
of antiretroviral therapy is likely to make HIV preva-
lence higher because it reduces mortality, and thus 
increases the number of HIV-positive individuals in a 
population.
4. Epidemic peak. Th   is variable is a measure of whether a 
country’s HIV epidemic peaked before 1999 and is 
based on the epidemic curves presented by UNAIDS 
and WHO in their epidemiological fact sheets for each 
country in sub-Saharan Africa [74]. Countries whose 
epidemics have plateaued are coded depending on 
whether the plateau was reached before or after 1999. 
Countries with older epidemics have a greater chance 
of experi  encing a decline in prevalence because of 
more time for the epidemic to run its course, or for the 
govern  ment and society to respond.
I experimented with a number of variables that were 
ultimately not utilized in the name of parsimony, and 
because their absence does not substantively change the 
results. Th  ese included whether a country had experi-
enced a war and whether a country was a democracy, as 
well as a ﬁ  ner  speciﬁ   cation of former colonial power, 
including an indicator for former French colonies. 
Similarly, although controlling for the number of births 
attended by a skilled practitioner is a reasonable control 
for the analysis of PMTCT coverage, skilled birth 
attendance is highly correlated with GDP per capita 
(Pearson’s r=0.704), so the inclusion of GDP per capita in 
the model is suﬃ   cient. An additional control that would 
be ideal to include, but for which data are too extensively 
missing, is death rates from HIV, which can reduce 
prevalence in the same way that antiretroviral coverage 
can increase prevalence. Finally, although family planning 
eﬀ  ort scores [57] capture some of the dynamic I describe 
in terms of population interventions, they are missing for 
far more countries than either the IPPF aﬃ   liate  or 
population policy data, which exist for all countries.
I discuss univariate and bivariate statistics ﬁ  rst, and 
then present the results from multivariate, ordinary-least 
squares regressions predicting the change in HIV 
prevalence between 2001 and 2009, the change in HIV 
incidence between 2001 and 2009, ARV coverage in 2009, 
and PMTCT coverage in 2009. Th   e data set theoretically 
has 47 observations, representing each country in sub-
Saharan Africa, but due to missing data and several 
outliers, analyses have between 32 and 42 countries. A 
larger sample size would be ideal, but the lack of reliable, 
comparable data on HIV prevalence or incidence from 
before 2001 or between 2001 and 2009, makes a country-
year analysis impossible. Similarly, while expanding the 
analysis to look at all developing countries would be 
feasible, given the unique dynamics and timing of 
population interventions in sub-Saharan Africa, it makes 
the most sense to test the hypothesis on Africa alone. Th  e 
small N indicates in particular that the multivariate 
results should be interpreted in conjunction with the case 
studies described here, as well as the bivariate results in 
Figure 2.
Results
Table  1 shows descriptive statistics for all variables in-
cluded in the analysis. On average, HIV prevalence 
declined by 13% between 2001 and 2009, and HIV inci-
dence declined by 26%. Th   ese averages, of course, obscure 
a good deal of variation, with change in HIV prevalence 
ranging from a decline of 48% (Côte d’Ivoire) to an increase 
of 25% (Guinea-Bissau), and change in HIV incidence 
varying from an 81% decline (Namibia) to a 4% increase 
(Uganda). In terms of the other two depen  dent variables, 
on average 36% of people needing ARV therapy in 2009 
received it, while 42% of HIV-positive preg  nant women on 
average received PMTCT interven  tions.
In terms of independent variables, almost 80% of 
countries have a population policy, and slightly less than 
two-thirds of countries have an IPPF aﬃ   liate founded 
before 1986. On average, countries had a GDP per capita 
of slightly more than $800 per year. Cultural diversity is 
relatively high, with an average fractionalization score of 
0.42, and 40% of countries are former British colonies. In 
terms of the HIV-related controls, a third of countries are 
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average slightly less than $10 per person from the Global 
Fund between 2002 and 2009. Finally, in 2006, only 
slightly more than a quarter of people in need of 
antiretroviral therapy were receiving it (based on the old, 
WHO guidelines), and the epidemic peaked before 1999 
in approximately one-third of countries.
Figure 2 depicts the bivariate relationships between the 
key population interventions (early IPPF aﬃ   liates and the 
existence of a population policy) and the dependent 
variables. All of these ﬁ  gures show eﬀ  ects in the expected 
direction: having an early IPPF aﬃ   liate or a population 
policy is associated with better HIV outcomes. Th  e 
diﬀ  erence is statistically signiﬁ  cant at the p <0.05 level for 
the change in HIV prevalence, and at the p <0.10 level for 
ARV and PMTCT coverage.
Table 2 presents the results from the multivariate analy-
sis, which includes four diﬀ  erent dependent variables and 
similar independent variables. Models 1 and 2 present 
standardized coeﬃ     cients from ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions predicting change in HIV prevalence 
and change in HIV incidence, respectively, between 2001 
and 2009. A decrease in the dependent variable is a good 
thing, so negative coeﬃ   cients indicate a more favorable 
outcome (a larger decline in prevalence or incidence). 
Models 3 and 4 present standardized coeﬃ   cients from 
OLS regressions predicting levels of ARV and PMTCT 
coverage in 2009. In these models, positive coeﬃ   cients 
indicate a more favourable outcome (greater coverage).
Model 1 shows that after controlling for whether a 
country has an “old” epidemic (one that peaked prior to 
1999), as well as antiretroviral coverage, the best predic-
tors of declines in HIV prevalence are having an early 
IPPF aﬃ   liate and being a PEPFAR focus country. Holding 
all variables constant at their means, a country with an 
early IPPF aﬃ     liate is predicted to experience a 20.6% 
decline in HIV prevalence between 2001 and 2009, while 
a country without an aﬃ   liate is expected to have only a 
3.0% decline. Th  e positive sign on the PEPFAR variable 
indicates that focus countries experienced smaller declines 
in prevalence than non-focus countries. Th  is ﬁ  nding is 
most likely not reﬂ   ective of the impact of PEPFAR’s 
activities, but rather the result of PEPFAR generally 
targeting hard-hit countries.
Model 2 shows that many more factors are predictive 
of change in HIV incidence than of change in HIV 
prevalence. Speciﬁ   cally, having a population policy, as 
well as more GDP per capita is associated with greater 
declines in incidence. Speciﬁ  cally, holding all variables 
constant at their means, a country with a population 
Figure 2. Comparison of organizational and political variables related to population interventions with HIV outcomes. IPPF, International 
Planned Parenthood Federation; ARV, antiretroviral; PMTCT, prevention of mother to child transmission.
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Variable Mean  Std.  dev.  Min.  Max.  N
Dependent  variables      
  Change in HIV prevalence 2001-2009  -0.13  0.19  -0.48  0.25  34
  Change in HIV incidence 2001-2009  -0.26  0.23  -0.81  0.04  32
  Antiretroviral coverage, 2009   35. 7  19.5  2.0  8  8.0  42
  PMTCT coverage, 2009  41.6  26.8  2.0  95.0  41
Population-related variables
  Population policy indica  tor  0.78  0.42  0  1  34
 IPPF  affi   liate founded before 1986  0.63  0.49  0  1  34
General controls 
  Average GDP per capita, 2001-2009 (2000 US$)  821  1,081  141  4,059  34
  Cultural  fractionalization  0.42 0.19 0.00 0.73  34
  Former British colony  0.41  0.50  0  1  34
HIV-related controls
  PEPFAR focus country  0.34  0.48  0  1  34
  Average per capita Global Fund HIV disbursements, 2001-2009 (US$)  9.76  13.20  0.77  63.98  34
  Antiretroviral coverage, 2006   0.29  0.21  0.06  0.95  34
  Epidemic peaked prior to 1999  0.31  0.47  0  1  34
Sources: See text
Note: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables refer to the countries included in the analysis of that variable. Values for all other variables refer to the analysis of 
change in prevalence (N=34). The descriptive statistics are highly similar, however, regardless of the particular sample. See note at bottom of Table 2 for detailed listing 
of countries excluded from each sample.
Table 2. Standardized coeffi   cients from ordinary least squares regressions predicting HIV outcomes, sub-Saharan Africa, 
2001-2009
    (1) (2) (3) (4)
    Change in HIV  Change in HIV  ARV coverage  PMTCT coverage
Covariates  prevalence 2001-09   incidence 2001-09  2009  2009
Population-related variables
  Population policy indicator  -0.102  -0.533*  0.303*  0.304**
 IPPF  affi   liate founded before 1986  -0.468*  -0.025  -0.009  -0.050
General controls 
  GDP per capita  -0.027  -0.671**  0.271*  0.347**
 Cultural  fractionalization  -0.196  0.120  -0.261*  -0.124
  Former British colony  0.330  0.454*  -0.214  0.202†
HIV-related controls
  PEPFAR focus country  0.365†  -0.187  0.349*  0.301**
  Global Fund HIV disbursements  0.089  -0.527*  0.373**  0.359**
  Antiretroviral coverage   -0.361  0.455†   
  Epidemic peaked prior to 1999  -0.549**  -0.391*   
N    34 32 42 41
R2   47.9% 46.4% 56.1% 72.9%
Note: Signifi  cance indicated by † p < 0.10 level; * p < 0.05 level; ** p < 0.01 level, *** p < 0.001 level
Countries missing from Model 1: Cape Verde, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Liberia, Mauritius, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan
Countries missing from Model 2: Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia and Sudan
Countries missing from Model 3: Cape Verde, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Somalia
Countries missing from Model 4: Cape Verde, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe, and Somalia
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Page 9 of 13policy would be predicted to experience a 32.7% decline 
in HIV incidence between 2001 and 2009, while a country 
without such a policy would be predicted to experience 
only a 3.8% decline. Furthermore, in this model, Global 
Fund disbursements play a positive role (leading to 
greater declines). Intriguingly, the coeﬃ   cient for former 
British colonies is signiﬁ  cant but positive, indicating that 
former British colonies experienced smaller declines in 
incidence. While it is possible that this outcome reﬂ  ects 
some diﬀ  erence in these countries’ institutional capacity 
resulting from colonialism, more likely it is the result of 
the fact that most former British colonies are located in 
southern and eastern Africa, the areas hardest hit by the 
HIV epidemic.
Models 3 and 4, predicting diﬀ  erent types of anti  retro-
viral coverage, are largely consistent with one another. 
Countries with population policies do a better job of 
provid  ing such services to their citizens. Indeed, a country 
with a population policy is predicted to have an ARV 
coverage rate 13.3 absolute percentage points higher, and 
a PMTCT coverage rate 18.7 absolute percentage points 
higher, than a country without such a policy, holding all 
other variables constant at their means. In addition, 
wealthier countries also more eﬀ  ectively provide anti-
retroviral coverage. Interestingly, in the case of overall 
ARV coverage speciﬁ  cally, high levels of cultural frac-
tionali  zation are associated with lower levels of coverage, 
which echoes the ﬁ  ndings of Lieberman [37]. Th  e  eﬀ  ect 
of international funding for HIV-related activities clearly 
comes to bear in these models, as PEPFAR and Global 
Fund funds are both positive predictors of antiretroviral 
coverage.
Th   e four models are designed to capture two types of 
success in addressing HIV. Models 1 and 2 analyze factors 
that may be associated with successful prevention eﬀ  orts, 
while Models 3 and 4 are solely about treatment. Looking 
at the models in this way suggests two key observations. 
First, it seems to be more diﬃ   cult to predict changes in 
HIV prevalence and incidence than it is to predict 
treatment success: the R2 values are somewhat lower for 
the ﬁ  rst two models than for the second two models. Th  is 
means that there are additional factors, most likely 
diﬃ   cult-to-measure ones, driving diﬀ  erential success in 
prevention eﬀ  orts.
Second, resources (broadly construed) are clearly very 
important to both prevention and treatment. Greater 
amounts of GDP per capita are associated with better 
prevention and treatment options. Th   is may indicate that 
there are actually more resources to be put towards inter-
ventions, that there exist other social institutions that 
similarly facilitate interventions, or may reﬂ  ect  lower 
levels of poverty, which can drive HIV outcomes through 
numerous pathways. And while there is some evidence 
that greater resources in the form of more foreign aid 
directly targeting HIV is associated with greater preven-
tion success, funds from PEPFAR and the Global Fund 
are strongly associated with treatment success, indicating 
the challenges of prevention interventions.
Omitted variables are an important consideration in 
any statistical analysis. Two hypothetically important 
variables, democracy and conﬂ   ict, were knowingly 
omitted from the regression analysis in the name of 
parsimony because they showed no correlation with any 
of the dependent variables in either bivariate or 
multivariate contexts. Th   ere are, however, other variables 
that may inﬂ  uence the transmission of HIV and so may 
also particularly inﬂ  uence Models 1 and 2, but that were 
not entered into the regressions. Th   ese include variables 
related to the prevalence of parasitic infections, including 
malaria, schistosomiasis and various intestinal helminths 
[10,75], as well as variables measuring exposure to HIV 
through unsafe injection practices [75].
While rigorous debate continues about the relative role 
of these factors in explaining variation in HIV prevalence 
[76,77], their potential impact is partially reﬂ  ected by the 
inclusion of GDP per capita. Inclusion of alternative 
measures for GDP per capita that relate to diﬀ  erent 
theories about the transmission of HIV (the percentage 
of the population living on less than two dollars per day, 
the percentage of the population with access to clean 
water, and the percentage of the population under-
nourished) yielded substantively similar results for the 
analysis of change in HIV prevalence, and were much less 
predictive than GDP per capita in the analysis of change 
in HIV incidence (results not shown).
Taken together, these models show a signiﬁ  cant impact 
of organizational and political factors resulting from 
population interventions – speciﬁ  cally, IPPF aﬃ   liates and 
population policies – on HIV outcomes. Th  ey also 
indicate that other factors are important. Level of 
resources, both in the form of GDP per capita and in the 
form of funds from major HIV donors, are signiﬁ  cantly 
associated with positive HIV outcomes, particularly 
those related to provision of antiretroviral coverage. 
Cultural fractionalization plays a role in overall ARV 
coverage, while the role of being a former British colony 
seems to be mixed. In the case of change in HIV 
incidence, it is associated with worse outcomes (perhaps 
because this variable also captures southern African 
countries), while in the case of PMTCT coverage, it is 
associated with better outcomes (perhaps because of 
better institutional structures).
Conclusions
Th  e analysis in this article provides support for the 
hypothesis that interventions related to slowing popu-
lation growth that predated the HIV epidemic in sub-
Saharan Africa have impacted HIV outcomes. Given that 
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cannot be deﬁ  nitively ascertained. Th   e brief dis  cussion of 
Senegal and Malawi, however, provides more details on 
the causal mechanisms at play. Speciﬁ  cally, it seems that 
in Senegal, the development of NGOs, as well as 
government interaction with religious leaders asso  ciated 
with eﬀ  orts to provide family planning, may have laid the 
groundwork for similar relationships addressing HIV/
AIDS. In Malawi, however, suspicions about condoms 
and outside eﬀ   orts to change sexual behaviours that 
dated from the time before HIV/AIDS may have made an 
already diﬃ     cult task, HIV prevention, even more 
diﬃ   cult.
Th  e quantitative analysis of all sub-Saharan African 
countries reinforces this interpretation. Having an older 
IPPF aﬃ     liate is associated with better HIV outcomes. 
Most likely, IPPF organizations were able to move fairly 
seamlessly into HIV-related work from their family 
planning base. Th  ey may also have had experience 
accessing both hard-to-reach populations, as well as 
targeting powerful social actors, such as religious leaders 
and politicians. Th  e interpretation of the population 
policy variable is somewhat less straightforward. Having 
one can be interpreted as representing governmental 
willingness to address issues related to sex, good relation-
ships with donors, or even government eﬀ  ectiveness (i.e., 
the ability to pass policies).
In addition to supporting the hypothesis that historical 
factors related to previous health interventions have 
impacted HIV outcomes, the ﬁ  ndings from this analysis 
also touch on a current debate, which is about the relative 
merits of further integrating family planning and broader 
reproductive healthcare services into HIV interventions. 
Th  ere is solid rationale for attempting such integration 
[78], given that condoms prevent both pregnancy and 
HIV transmission, and because family planning is fre-
quently the only way that African women interact with 
the healthcare system [79]. While much of this discussion 
relates to service provision, this analysis suggests that 
there are beneﬁ  ts to be gained from drawing on struc-
tures and knowledge that exist from population-related 
interventions and applying them to HIV interventions.
In conclusion, this analysis provides support for the 
hypothesis that organizational and structural features of 
countries, particularly those related to population 
interventions, facilitated better HIV outcomes. By 
focusing on macro factors, including population policy 
and family planning NGOs, this analysis highlights the 
importance of looking beyond the individual determi-
nants of health outcomes to the structures that shape the 
context in which people live their lives, make decisions 
about health, and access health-related resources. It 
suggests that attention should be paid to building 
organizational and political structures that can assist in 
addressing HIV, but that can also be applied to future 
health needs. Th   e analysis also indicates the importance 
of ﬁ   nding ways to address structural factors, such as 
poverty and cultural fractionalization, that inhibit posi-
tive outcomes.
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